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Abstract: Lindquist et al. present a strong case for a constructionist
account of emotion. First, we elaborate on the ramifications that a
constructionist account of emotions might have for psychiatric
disorders with emotional disturbances as core elements. Second, we
reflect on similarities between Lindquist et al.’s model and recent
attempts at formulating psychiatric disorders as networks of causally
related symptoms.
Fear is not localized in the amygdala, nor does sadness exclusively
arise in the anterior cingulate cortex. Unfortunately for Gall (Gall
& Spurzheim 1835), and more recent proponents, who hypoth-
esized that single brain areas (later referred to as “particular cir-
cuits”; see Kandel & Squire 1992) correspond to single functions
(e.g., arithmetic skills), feelings (e.g., pride) or attitudes (e.g., reli-
giosity); locationist perspectives on such functions, feelings, and
attitudes and their hypothesized unique “signature” in the
brain increasingly turn out to be wrong (e.g., Bartholomew
2004; Poldrack 2006). Likewise, as Lindquist et al. convincingly
argue, emotions are not recognized by the brain as separate enti-
ties and, as such, do not each have their own seat and unique acti-
vation signature in the brain. Instead, Lindquist et al. present a
strong case for a constructionist perspective in which emotions
are comprised of multiple, more basic processes, which are
each associated with their own location and activation signature
in the brain. The combined outcomes of these processes result
in the individual experience of a particular emotion.
If Lindquist et al.’s constructionist perspective is an accurate
representation of the relation between emotions and the brain,
what ramifications might this have for those psychiatric disorders
that have emotional disturbances as core elements? Among other
processes, Lindquist et al. distinguish between core affect (i.e.,
mental representation of bodily representations) and conceptual-
ization (i.e., sensations from the body or external world that are
made meaningful). Major depression (MD) is a psychiatric dis-
order with “sadness” as one of the core elements, and it is well
known that, in many cases, an episode of MD is preceded by
stressful life events such as marital or health problems (e.g.,
Kendler et al. 1999). Although such life events are potentially
quite aversive in nature, most people do not develop an
episode of MD after experiencing them: So why are some
people so severely affected by a stressful life event whereas
most others are not? One explanation could be that in people
who develop an episode of MD after a stressful life event the
conceptualization process is dysfunctional; most people would
respond with some sadness after a quarrel with a spouse (i.e.,
“normal” core affect), but in people with MD, this event is
overly negatively conceptualized (“See, even my husband does
not love me”). Such a hypothesis is consistent with clinical
observations that patients with MD often engage in excessive
rumination about past events (e.g., Roelofs et al. 2008a; 2008b).
On the other hand, in disorders with “fear” as a core element,
the core affect process might have gone awry. Patients with a
specific phobia are extremely fearful of certain objects (e.g.,
hypodermic needles), situations (e.g., flying an airplane), or
animals (e.g., spiders) that do not elicit the same response in
most other people. When confronted with, for example, a
spider, patients with a phobia for that object will respond with
various bodily sensations (e.g., profuse sweating, heart palpita-
tions) to that object, whereas people without the phobia will
not experience such bodily sensations; in terms of the Lindquist
et al. perspective, specific phobia patients react with excessive
core affect to phobic objects compared to non-phobic patients.
Distinguishing emotional disorders in terms of Lindquist
et al.’s proposed processes might implicate a shift in clinical
neuroscience from searching for the dysfunctional brain area
causing a particular disorder to searching which brain areas do
not optimally work together in perceiving and interpreting exter-
nal stimuli (e.g., will we find that the conceptualization network is
overly active in patients with MD?). This implication of Lindquist
et al.’s work, that psychiatric disorders are not likely to be
explained in terms of one dysfunctional brain area, bears a
striking resemblance to recent attempts at formulating psychia-
tric disorders as networks of causally related symptoms (Bors-
boom 2008; Cramer et al. 2010; Kendler et al. 2011). In the
network approach, psychiatric disorders are hypothesized to
stem from direct interactions between symptoms (e.g., feeling
tired ! sleeping a lot ! concentration problems) instead of
from one underlying biological dysfunction (e.g., serotonin dys-
function causes all symptoms of MD). As such, each symptom
is an autonomous causal entity and it is unlikely that such entities
share the exact same etiological mechanisms: For example, symp-
toms such as insomnia and fatigue are likely governed by homeo-
static processes, whereas symptoms such as guilty feelings and
depressed mood are more likely regulated by cognitive processes
(e.g., rumination). This hypothesis also lies at the heart of a
theory in which psychiatric disorders are mechanistic property
clusters (MPCs): mutually reinforcing networks of causal mech-
anisms at multiple levels of explanation (e.g., symptoms, brain).
Each of these conceptualizations suggests that there are no
hard delineations between disorders, as the processes that
carry forward disturbances in a network are unlikely to be con-
fined to a single set of symptoms (i.e., have a transdiagnostic
character).
Thus, Lindquist et al.’s constructionist account is suggestive
of mutually reinforcing networks at the brain level that, when
working optimally, result in the subjective experience of an
appropriate particular emotion (e.g., fear when confronted with
an angry grizzly bear). However, if one or more of those networks
do not optimally work together, the result can be an inappropri-
ate emotion (e.g., excessive fear when confronted with a spider).
Subsequently, the network approach (i.e., mutually reinforcing
networks at the symptom level) explains why, for example, a dys-
functional core affect process does not result in a specific phobia
but results in excessive fear of a particular object or situation:
other symptoms of a specific phobia, for example avoiding the
feared object or situation, are a result of the excessive fear (i.e.,
one symptom causing the other). One way to investigate this
hypothesis is by gathering intensive time-series data with which
one can accurately monitor the development of symptoms (and
interactions among them) over time. This approach can be com-
bined with frequent fMRI scans in order to link, for example,
excessive activation of the conceptualization network, to the
subsequent development of MD symptoms.
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Abstract: In matters of the mind, the opposition between what is mind-
made or inside and natural or outside the mind is bound to misfire.
Lindquist et al. build their analysis on a strong contrast between
naturalism, which they reject, and psychologism, which they endorse.
We challenge this opposition and indicate how adopting psychologism
to combat a naturalistic view of emotional mind/brain areas is
self-defeating. We briefly develop the alternative view of emotions as
mental organs.
Lindquist et al. challenge the view that the most familiar emotion
words and the linguistically expressed emotion experiences are
ultimately the natural kinds found in the brain/mind, referred
to as “naturalism” for short. Naturalism traditionally refers to
the view that some of the entities the mind reasons with and
decides about exist outside of and independent from these
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mental operations. Let us label this physicalist naturalism.
However, when naturalism is used to refer to putative entities
in the mind/brain, the situation is much more complex. Menta-
listic naturalism as opposed to physicalist naturalism, seems to
postulate that there are entities in the mind that are not mind-
made. As Lindquist et al. present it, for naturalism basic emotions
are such mind-independent entities. Emotions, in the naturalistic
view the authors challenge, stand for mind-independent or for
biological categories, which are essentially present in the mind-
brain. Psychologism, by contrast, does not build on anything
given other than its own operations, which are the same whatever
the subject matter.
Interestingly, the description of the alternative view Lindquist
et al. endorse, psychological constructivism, consists of entirely
content-general mental operations that operate over inputs that
are not necessarily emotional. So, other aspects aside, the con-
trast the authors set up is between emotional determinism and
emotional indeterminism of the mind’s building blocks.
The inherent contradictions of an area-focused meta-
analysis. Lindquist et al. are rightfully critical of the approach
that has been prominent in the majority of brain imaging
studies aspiring to localize the neurofunctional basis of each
single emotion in a dedicated brain area. For example, the amyg-
dala was the fear area, the insula was the disgust area, and so
forth. Meta-analyses inherit the weak points of still less-than-
perfect brain imaging techniques and cannot but endorse and
amplify them. fMRI studies vary widely in scanner properties,
in settings, in designs, and in tasks, including the involvement
of attention, awareness, and contrast stimuli or conditions. The
meta-analysis exploits the very procedures under attack by
using positive activation levels of isolated brain areas themselves
obtained in a wide variety of studies. The meta-analytic con-
clusion that some areas play or do not play their anticipated
role, does not invalidate their role, and this role may or may
not show up in fMRI analysis. For example, the amygdala was
repeatedly shown to play a role in processing of emotional
stimuli, and brain imaging studies of autism are consistent with
this. However, patients with Urbach-Wiethe syndrome have a
major deficit of the basolateral amygdala, yet show no signs of
autistic behavior. There are many more examples illustrating
that there is no rigid link between a brain area and a functional
deficit. But the suggestion of attributing functions to a network
rather that to a single area is likely to beg the question.
Another approach to emotions is needed. It must be possible
to avoid naive naturalism and extreme psychologism.
Emotions are mind organs. Emotions are mind/body adap-
tations, evolved in natural and social contexts (in a partly
species-specific way). As emotions serve different goals, they
have evolved next to each other and inhabit brain/body resources
in different ways to fit their goals (Panksepp 1998). Yet in contrast
to many approaches, different emotions are interdependent and
interrelated. We do not believe that emotions must await neuroa-
natomical dissection to prove that they operate as cooperating
distinct entities, even if functional distinctions can be made
and appear in clinical symptoms. We know that this is unrealistic
with current functional neuroimaging techniques. For example,
different emotions produce different facial expressions in a pre-
dictable way, although we can reasonably assume that we are
unable at the moment to distinguish between motor activity
associated with angry versus fearful expressions. In the very
same way, the visceral activation and the associated feeling will
be different between disgust and anger, but it is unlikely that
these emotional experiences can be disentangled spatially by
their cortical somatosensory responses. In our view, emotions
entail a distributed neural system, and focusing on its com-
ponents, whether from a locationist or from a psychological con-
structionist perspective, is equally and inherently reductionist.
First, psychological constructivism reduces emotions to a sum
of parts, ignoring that a particular neural component exerts its
function in relation to and sometimes driven by the other
components of the individual emotion system (e.g., Benuzzi
et al. 2009; Liang et al. 2009). This emotion-specific connectivity
pattern is an essential and mandatory characteristic of emotions.
Second, by attributing a specific psychological operation to a
gross anatomical component, the degrees of freedom of the func-
tional contribution of this component to a particular emotional
state are reduced. For example, the amygdala may signal motiva-
tional salience in some instances but may critically contribute to
the fear response in others. Patients with epilepsy caused by
sclerosis of the amygdala, for example, may experience intense
fear during their seizures, in the absence of any relevant object
(Van Paesschen et al. 2001). Third, emotion-specific activation
at the cellular level in monkey studies (Kuraoka & Nakamura
2007) somewhat contradicts the postulation of generic regional
operations that is made by psychological constructivism.
Just as organs have different functions in the body, emotions
serve different functions in the mind. The traditional terminology
of basic emotions as states is indeed inappropriate to catch these
functions. They encompass not just a network of brain areas, as
these activation peaks are the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the neu-
rofunctional facts revealed by brain imaging studies of neurotypi-
cal subjects, are structural facts, inhibitory and excitatory
modulations in dynamic networks, endocrinological signatures,
behavioral engrams laid down by phylogenetic and ontogenetic
experience, and so on. Most importantly in this context, the func-
tion of an organ, in this case the minds’ emotions, needs to be
understood in relation to the others and of the whole. Just as
the body cannot be reduced to a collection of independent
organs, the emotions operate in concert, and whether in health
or in sickness, they need to be considered together. Balanced
or unbalanced, the interaction between the emotion organs
makes and breaks the self. One may still call this “psychologism,”
but then any view on emotions is “psychologism.”
A rigorous approach for testing the
constructionist hypotheses of brain function
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Abstract: Although the target article provides strong evidence against the
locationist view, evidence for the constructionist view is inconclusive,
because co-activation of brain regions does not necessarily imply
connectivity between them. We propose a rigorous approach wherein
connectivity between co-activated regions is first modeled using
exploratory Granger causality, and then confirmed using dynamic
causal modeling or Bayesian modeling.
Lindquist et al. seek to distinguish between locationist and con-
structionist models of emotion by performing a meta-analysis of
brain activations during various types of emotional stimuli. Meth-
odologically speaking, the discovery of activated brain areas using
the general linear model is primarily geared towards the
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